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COMMUTING COSTS AND LABOR FORCE RETIREMENT 
 
Jorge González  
 
ABSTRACT 
  This paper studies whether the increase in home-workplace separation observed 
among U.S. older male workers in the last decades of the 20th century can partly account for 
earlier retirement. We first extend a conventional residential location-labor supply model in 
order to examine potential mechanisms linking commuting and retirement. After showing 
that, as a consequence of the urban residential equilibrium, it is possible that workers residing 
further from the workplace retire earlier, PSID data and an instrumental variables approach 
are combined in order to assess the nature and strength of the relation. 
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1.   INTRODUCTION 
The choice of the moment of retirement from the labor force is an important decision in 
the sphere of individual labor supply behavior, whose study can serve to validate 
economic theories, to know the magnitude of one facet of the labor-leisure trade-off, or 
to know the consequences of current public policies and inform their eventual reform. 
For reasons like these, economists have devoted substantial efforts towards 
understanding the retirement decision. A general conclusion emerging from the 
academic literature on retirement is that its timing is influenced by incentives stemming 
from many different factors, including the provisions of pension and social security 
systems (e.g., Boskin 1977, Mitchell and Fields 1984, Stock and Wise 1990, Gruber and 
Wise 1999, 2004), health conditions (Rust and Phelan 1997, French 2005), the 
availability of health insurance (Madrian et al. 1994), couples’ synchronous enjoyment 
of recreation activities (Gustman and Steinmeier 2000, Coile 2004), and job 
characteristics (Filer and Petri 1988). Despite this seemingly ample research, a scholar 
in the field of aging has recently concluded that the decline in labor force participation 
rates (LFPR) observed among U.S. older men from the 1960s through the 1980s cannot 
be explained by any of the main factors investigated in that literature (Blau and 
Goodstein 2007). 
When the residential and job locations do not coincide, and it is thus necessary to 
commute between them, several costs are incurred. We spend money on gas or fares, we 
spend time, we suffer the discomfort created by crowds, traffic congestion, weather 
conditions, etc. In 2003, for example, weekly commuting expenses of an U.S. worker in 
the age range 55-64 averaged $69,
1 whereas average commuting time for the same 
person was about 3 hours per week
2. A study comparing workers’ affective evaluations 
of 16 common daily activities (Kahneman et al. 2004) reports that commuting has the 
lowest rating in the scale of positive affect descriptors, and the third highest in the scale 
of negative affect descriptors, being for example above housework in negative affect. 
Intuitively, one may wonder whether the disincentives to remain employed created by 
                                                 
1 Author’s calculation with data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation 
(http://www.sipp.census.gov/sipp/, accessed on March 23, 2007). In particular, data from the 9th wave of 
the 2001 SIPP Panel, collected between October 2003 and January 2004, were used. Workers’ commuting 
expenses include fares for those who did not use their own vehicle to commute, and mileage expenses 
plus parking fees and tolls for those who used their own vehicle. Mileage expenses are calculated as miles 
driven times 51.7 cents per mile. The average cost per mile is obtained from a publication of the 
American Automobile Association. 
(http://www.aaanewsroom.net/Main/Default.asp?CategoryID=4&ArticleID=196, accessed on March 23, 
2007). 
2 Author’s calculation with data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics’ American Time Use Survey 
2003 (http://www.bls.gov/tus/, accessed on October 26, 2006).   2
these costs reduce the age at retirement. Indeed, as shown in Figure 1, which represents 
the average (one-way) distance to the workplace for the population of U.S. workers 
aged 55-64 for selected years between 1971 and 2001
3, and the LFPR of men 55-64, the 
decline in older males’ LFPR in the U.S. coincided with their tendency to live further 
from the workplace.
4 We want to know whether this increase in home-workplace 
separation can partly account for earlier retirement. 
Figure 1. Average home-workplace separation (+) and LFPR (-) 

































Notes: Author’s calculations with data from: (+) Panel Study of Income Dynamics (1971-1986), Nationwide 
Personal Transportation Survey (1995), and National Household Travel Survey (2001); (-) Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. 
 
The purpose of this paper is therefore to investigate the effect of commuting on 
retirement. Section 2 examines this potential link from a theoretical viewpoint, 
extending a residential location model with a labor-leisure choice. There we shall see 
that the costs of commuting are partly chosen by the worker, and that, in the urban 
space, these costs are compensated by housing savings. But if the costs of commuting 
are compensated, how can commuting affect retirement? We discuss the conditions for 
                                                 
3 Values for 1971-1986 were calculated with data from the PSID (in 1969 and 1970 the PSID asked 
distance to the workplace of those driving to get to work only), whereas those for 1995 and 2001 were 
computed with data from the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Nationwide Personal Transportation 
Survey 1995 (NPTS) and National Household Travel Survey 2001 (NHTS). NPTS and NHTS data were 
downloaded on August 2, 2007, starting at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/ohpi/nhts/index.htm. The 
NPTS 1990 does not contain information about distance to work. We think estimates are comparable, for 
the three surveys are representative of the non-institutionalized population and the questions used to 
assess the home-workplace separation do not seem capable of inducing different reporting errors: the 
survey question used by the PSID is “About how many miles is it to where you work?” That used by the 
U.S. Department of Transportation surveys is “What is the one-way distance from your home to your 
workplace?” 
4 This tendency is not exclusive of U.S. older workers, but part of a general shift common to OECD 
countries (Schafer 2000).   3
the existence of an age-at-retirement gradient in the urban space: motivated solely by 
the existence of commuting costs, workers who locate further from the workplace, but 
that are identical in all other respects to workers residing closer, may retire at a different 
age. Section 3 uses data from the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics in order to 
assess the sign and magnitude of the effect of commuting on retirement: ceteris paribus, 
how would the age at retirement change if distance to the workplace is increased by one 
mile? To answer this question we make use of an instrumental variable approach, which 
allows overcoming the endogeneity issue created by commuting costs being in part 
chosen by the workers. A summary of the analysis is provided in Section 4. 
This paper contributes to a field of research formed by the intersection of urban and 
labor economics, which is summarized and critically assessed in Simpson and van der 
Veen (1992), Koslowsky et al. (1995, Ch. 5), and Crampton (1999). Of the works in this 
field, Oi (1976) and Kolodziejczyk (2006) are particularly relevant to our research. Oi 
develops a theoretical framework in which workers choose residential locations and 
supplies of daily hours of work and workdays per year in order to maximize utility. 
Kolodziejczyk links the age at retirement to the fixed costs of work. He shows that, 
under certain conditions, higher fixed costs of work may lead to earlier retirement, 
particularly when workers are impatient. In his model, however, the fixed costs of work 
are exogenous to the worker, and there is no attempt to quantify the effect. Both 
concerns will be considered in our contribution. 
2. A MODEL OF RESIDENTIAL LOCATION AND LABOR FORCE 
RETIREMENT 
Considered here is the decision of a worker (or of a household represented by a worker), 
whose job is secured, but whose residential location is to be chosen. As in Alonso 
(1964), the place where the worker lives (or arrives) is conceived as a circular entity 
located on a uniform, featureless plain, with all employment concentrated in a central 
business district (CBD) of fixed and negligible size. (The centralized employment 
assumption is justified below.) The worker chooses one residential location, represented 
by its distance to the CBD. The transportation system is assumed to be infinitely-elastic 
supplied in any direction from the CBD, being the only travel that of workers 
commuting between residences and work places.   4
The worker’s remaining years of life () T  are split into years working () H  and years 
being retired () L .
5 Preferences are defined over L, housing space () Q , other 
consumption goods () X , and distance to the CBD () D , and are represented by the 
utility function 
  () ,,, UU L Q X D = . (1) 
Utility is assumed increasing in the first three arguments () 0, 1,2,3 j Uj >= , but 
decreasing in the fourth () 4 0 U < : other things equal, the worker would prefer to live 
near the CBD to reduce the discomfort experienced during the commute. 
The continuously differentiable function  () R D  stands for the market price of housing 
space, which the worker takes as given.
6 An extra year of work implies incurring in 
commuting expenses of amount  () CD, which are assumed increasing in D.
7 The 
worker’s budget constraint can thus be written as 
  () () X RDQ CDH W H Y ++ ≤ + , (2) 
where W  represents yearly earnings
8 and Y  is non-labor income. Since HTL =−, 
  () () () () () X RDQ W CD L F W CD T Y ++ − ≤ ≡ − + , (3) 
where  F  stands for the potential income available if working all T  periods. In this 
model, the (opportunity) price of an extra year as retiree equals foregone earnings minus 
avoided commuting expenses. That the price of leisure is affected by D makes the 
residential location and labor supply decisions to be simultaneously chosen. 
                                                 
5 For expository convenience, retirement is here modeled as an abrupt transition from work to complete 
labor-force withdrawal. Although the process by which older workers withdraw the labor market may be 
more complex, Lumsdaine and Mitchell (1999) concluded that the conventional pattern of work followed 
by non-work was characteristic of most older workers’ paths out of the labor market. 
6 In a competitive equilibrium,  () R D  would coincide with one of the worker’s price offer curves, these 
describing how much a worker is willing to pay for one unit of housing space at each location while 
enjoying a fixed level of utility (Straszheim 1987, p. 730). 
7 To concentrate the analysis, the within-period allocation of time is not specified, and the time cost of the 
journey to work is neglected (unless the number of commuting trips per year and the time per trip were 
constant, for then the time cost would be implicitly included in C ). See, e.g., Oi (1976), Wales (1978), 
and Cogan (1981) for analyses of within-year time allocation and commuting costs. 
8 As discussed in Rosen (1986, p. 674), in a monocentric urban model with homogeneous labor a single 
wage clears the labor market. Our analysis further abstracts equalizing or compensating wage 
differentials. These differences are best interpreted as the result of a job search process in which the 
acceptance wage increases in commuting expenses (Rosen 1986 and Crampton 1999). In this contribution 
we abstract job search from the model.   5
In the U.S., urban employment has been suburbanizing for a long time, and the 
assumption of centralized employment may be controversial. It has been argued that one 
of the basic factors that cause employment to move out of the CBD is the firms’ 
incentive to suburbanize as a consequence of paying lower wages, which workers are 
willing to accept because they would commute less. Even so, population was more 
suburbanized than employment during the time period (the 1970s and 1980s) object of 
empirical study (White 1999). Also, as long as decentralized firms capture their 
workers’ commuting savings in the form of lower wages, the workers’ price of leisure 
and, therefore, their demand for leisure would remain unaltered. For these reasons, 
centralized employment, it seems to me, is the simplest assumption mathematically that 
embodies the essential economics of the problem. 
The worker’s decision-making process can be decomposed into two stages. In the first 
stage, optimal quantities of L,  Q , and  X  are chosen for a given distance, obtaining a 
constrained or short-run maximum of utility. In the second stage, distance itself is 
chosen so as to maximize utility. Hence, the equilibrium of the model is characterized 
by expression (3), a set of first-order conditions for the short-run optimum, and a 






′′ −= − + . (4) 
The right-hand side of (4) represents the commuting costs (respectively, commuting 
savings) of a very short move from the equilibrium distance and away from (towards) 
the CBD. Marginal commuting costs are here made up of marginal commuting expenses 
() HC′  as well as marginal disutility costs ( 4 U λ − , expressed in monetary terms using 
the marginal utility of income, λ). For the term on the left-hand side to be positive too, 
housing prices must decline with distance to the CBD,  0 R′< , a result supported by the 
majority of the empirical evidence collected (Ball 1973, Sheppard 1999). Thus,  QR′ −  
denotes the savings (respectively, costs) implicit in purchasing a given quantity of 
housing that accrue from a very short move from the equilibrium distance and away 
from (towards) the CBD. Condition (4) expresses that the worker is unable to increase 
real income by a change of distance. 
The reason why expression (4) only indicates a property of the optimal distance without 
determining distance itself is that, if R′ satisfies (4), the worker is indifferent regarding 
distance, for in case of locating further, say, from the CBD greater commuting costs 
would be compensated by greater housing savings. But if the disincentives to remain 
                                                 
9 All these conditions are derived in the technical appendix. Condition (4) is further discussed in, among 
others, Alonso (1964), Muth (1969), Stucker (1975), and Oi (1976).   6
employed created by commuting costs are offset by housing savings, how might 
commuting and retirement be related? In the present framework, three different 
mechanisms might generate a relation between both. We discuss each in turn (algebraic 
derivations are provided in the technical appendix). 
Whenever  R′ satisfies (4), any distance to the CBD is of equilibrium. Yet, different 
distances imply different prices, and the equilibrium demand for leisure of identical 
workers could vary across the urban space as a consequence of substitution and income 
effects. Let  4 0, 1,2,3 j Uj == .
10 Then 
  () 11 21 1
L
QR HC R s C s
D
μ
∂ ′′ ′ ′ =− + + −
∂
. (5) 
Consider a worker residing further from the CBD than other colleagues. To compensate 
for his greater commuting costs, his housing savings have to be greater than his 
commuting expenses (for commuting costs include disutility costs), thus increasing his 
consumption possibilities. The term  () 1 QR HC μ ′′ −+  in (5), where  1 μ  is the full-income 
derivative of L, captures this income effect. By facing lower housing prices, this 
worker’s demand for leisure would be also modified by a cross-price effect, represented 
by the term  12 R s ′  in (5), where  12 s  is the compensated cross-price derivative of L with 
respect to the price of Q . Finally, by incurring in greater commuting expenses, his price 
of leisure would be lower. The positive term  11 Cs ′ −  in (5) stands for this effect, where 
11 s is the compensated own-price derivative of L. Although the sign of (5) is an 
empirical matter, if L is a normal good and L and Q  are Slutsky complements, 
expression (5) would be positive: workers residing further from the CBD, but being 
identical in all other respects to those residing closer, would retire earlier. This 
independent effect of commuting on retirement would give rise to an age-at-retirement 
gradient in the urban space. 
The age at retirement might be also modified by a variation in the amount of commuting 
expenses for a given distance,  () CD. More efficient transport means, changes in traffic 
congestion, or the introduction of commuting subsidies, for example, would generate 
this kind of variation. Keeping distance constant, a reduction, say, in commuting 
expenses would cause a negative income effect on age at retirement if L is a normal 
good. However, lower commuting expenses would increase the price of leisure, 
generating a positive substitution effect on age at retirement. If, as a consequence of the 
                                                 
10 That the utility of an extra year as retiree, of an extra square meter of housing space, and of an extra 
unit of other consumption goods are not influenced by distance is in accordance with our notion of the 
urban space as being featureless.   7
variation in commuting expenses, the worker moves,
11 new effects would further 
complicate the prediction of the sign of  LC ∂∂. 
Finally, commuting and retirement may be simultaneously affected by a common third 
variable. For example, it has been observed that, in the U.S., higher-income families 
settle further from the urban centre (e.g., Glaeser et al. 2008). If the demand for leisure 
depends on income, a (spurious) relation between commuting and retirement might be 
observed as a consequence of workers’ heterogeneous incomes. 
Although any of the three mechanisms just described can generate an empirical relation 
between commuting and retirement, both the causal status of the relation and the kind of 
data needed for estimating its magnitude are not the same. While the first two 
mechanisms can give rise to genuine causal relations between commuting and 
retirement, the empirical relation arising out of the last mechanism is however mediated 
by workers’ heterogeneous characteristics, and cannot be given a causal status. 
Regarding data needs, a cross-section of microeconomic data representative of a given 
urban area is sufficient to estimate the size of the equilibrium age-at-retirement gradient 
for that area, provided the data include information on current location of the home and 
the workplace as well as expected age at retirement, or current labor force status plus 
recent information on the home and workplace locations. If the data represents a region 
comprising several urban areas, the potential heterogeneity of urban age-at-retirement 
gradients has to be taken into account. To be able to identify the causal relation between 
commuting and retirement arising out of a change in commuting expenses for a given 
distance, however, panel data in which the event causing the change in commuting 
expenses could be identified would be required. 
3.  THE EFFECT OF COMMUTING ON RETIREMENT 
We now turn to the empirical question of estimating the independent effect of 
commuting on retirement, in particular that arising out of the equilibrium age-at-
retirement gradient, for the U.S. economy. In this order, we shall discuss the data and 
sample design utilized, the econometric model assumed, and the results obtained. 
3.1.  Data and sample design 
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) is one of the few large-scale surveys that 
have collected information on labor market outcomes and commuting characteristics. 
                                                 
11 Stucker (1975) studies how, and provides some evidence on by how much, a transport improvement 
may alter the structure of a community.   8
Since 1968, and generally on a yearly basis, this longitudinal survey interviews a 
representative sample of the U.S. population collecting a wide range of information 
(demographic, employment, income, etc.) In most data collection waves carried out 
between 1969 and 1986, heads and wives of PSID family units who were employed or 
looking for a job were asked the distance to the workplace and the travel to work time, 
both referring to the last job held if the respondent was unemployed at the moment of 
the interview.
12 Unfortunately, the PSID collects no information regarding the home and 
job locations, and therefore one cannot know whether the distance to the workplace 
genuinely represents distance to the CBD. An important proportion of commutes, 
however, should be commutes to the CBD, for Gobillon et al. (2007, p. 2404) estimate 
that, in the 10 largest U.S. metropolitan statistical areas, the proportion of jobs located 
in central cities was still 57 per cent in 1980. From this survey, all male labor force 
participants aged 41-60 in 1969, and considered heads of PSID families, are tracked 
from 1969 (the first wave with commuting information available) through 2005 (at the 
moment this study is done, the last wave available in the PSID). In the meantime, the 
study subjects may retire from the labor force, drop out from the survey, or still remain 
participating in 2005. 
The theoretical model developed previously assumed that distance to the workplace 
remained the same until the worker retired. The reason for making this assumption is 
that, even if several residential or workplace changes take place along a worker’s life, 
the age at which the worker leaves the work force would remain a function of the 
commuting characteristics of the final home-workplace separation, the separation for 
which commuting data are generally available. Therefore, although tracked along many 
periods, each study subject will contribute only one observation to this study (referred 
hereafter as the data wave): that corresponding to the survey wave closest to the wave of 
retirement that shows a change of residence or job.
13 To be consistent with this 
criterion, study subjects who retire after 1987, but that move or change job after the 
                                                 
12 “About how much time does it take you to get to work each day, door to door?”; “About how many 
miles is it to where you work?” Commuting time was not asked in 1982, whereas in 1969 and 1970 
commuting distance was asked of those driving to get to work only. The PSID makes available the 
annualized hours spent traveling to and from work. The time of a one-way commute is calculated dividing 
annual commuting hours by the product of weeks worked per year and commuting trips per week. Trips 
per week are assigned on the basis of hours worked per week on the main job according to this rule: if 
hours worked per week were less than 5, 2 trips per week were assumed; if hours were between 6 and 10, 
4 trips were assumed; if hours were between 11 and 20, 6 trips were assumed; if hours were between 21 
and 35, 8 trips were assumed; if hours were between 36 and 47, 10 trips were assumed; for 48 or more 
hours, 12 trips were assumed. 
13 As discussed below, to avoid a potential sample selection issue dummies for the age declared in the 
data wave have to be included among the covariates in the regression model for age at retirement. This 
necessity precludes taking the observation corresponding to the wave just before retirement to be included 
in the study, because then the age at retirement would be perfectly explained by the age one year before.   9
1986 interview, will not be included in the group of retirees because commuting 
information, which stopped to be collected in 1986, would be unknown for them. 
Instead, since only 18 subjects are in this situation, what we think renders useless the 
introduction of an additional statistical model for moves or job changes, they will be 
included in the group of attritors from the survey. 
In this version of the paper, we follow standard practice and determine a study subject’s 
labor force status from his answer to the question “Are you working now, unemployed, 
retired, or what?” We define respondents as being in the labor force if they identify 
themselves as currently working, unemployed/looking for work, or temporarily laid off. 
All other answers, including being permanently disabled, are considered indicative of 
retirement. The extension of the analysis to other notions of retirement (Lazear 1986) is 
left for future work. A study subject is considered an attritor if, before retiring, he leaves 
the survey or, as mentioned before, moves or changes job after the 1986 interview. 
Reasons for leaving the survey are that the entire family became non-response, that the 
subject died, or that a subject’s move out of the family unit was not successfully 
followed. Regarding moves, we consider a change in residential location has taken place 
when answering “Yes” to “Have you head moved since last spring/previous interview?” 
Since the 1988 wave, a job change between interviews can be established using 
information on the beginning date with the present employer: “In what month and year 
did you start working for your present employer? (Count yourself as the employer if 
you are self-employed, and) give us your most recent start date if you have gone to 
work for them more than once”. Before that wave, however, this precise information is 
not asked, and since the PSID generally provides no employer codes that uniquely 
identify jobs, establishing job changes is more complicated. We follow Brown and 
Light (1992) and assume that, before the 1988 wave, a job change has occurred 
whenever reported tenure is less than elapsed time since the previous interview.
14 In the 
subsequent analysis, attrition and retirement will be considered absorbing states. 
In the survey waves collected between the data wave and the wave of 
retirement/attrition, most study subjects report commuting characteristics different than 
those reported in the data wave: 71.6 percent of subjects report different distances, and 
83.3 percent report different times. While reporting errors may account for a proportion 
of the differences, the fact that the location of the workplace is unknown makes it 
possible that some fraction of the differences indicate genuine changes in distance or 
time to the workplace as a consequence, for example, of workers changing workplaces 
while doing the same job. Given the impossibility to include in the study the 
                                                 
14 For the interview years 1969-1975, job tenure was coded in intervals. The interval code is translated 
into a precise value of tenure using the midpoint of the reported tenure interval.   10
observation provided just before retirement (see note 13), each study subject is assigned 
the average values of commuting distance and commuting time reported between the 
data wave and the wave of retirement/attrition. If reporting errors are random, they 
would be faded away with this procedure. Taking the average is also relevant if, when 
choosing a job, the worker knows he may have different commutes as a consequence of 
the job being developed in different places. Differences between commuting values 
reported in the data wave and those averaged thereafter are small: averages in the 
former case are 10.0 miles and 23.9 minutes, whereas averages of individual-level 
averages amount to 9.8 miles and 22.8 minutes. 
3.2. Econometric  model 
The statistical model selected for analyzing the data has to be able to deal with non-
random attrition, left-truncation, and endogenous regressors. The stochastic processes 
underlying labor market behavior and the behavior concerning participation in the PSID 
may be non-independent. This would happen if, for example, retirees move to Florida 
and are lost by the survey, for then workers attriting at a given wave would be at an 
unusually high risk of retiring and would therefore not be representative of those 
continuing in the survey. Second, as discussed before, each study subject contributes 
one observation to the study. Their age at that observation need not be the same, what 
raises a potential sample selection issue created by the different labor force participation 
rates across ages. Finally, the theoretical model underlined the possibility that 
residential location and labor supply were simultaneously decided. This, in turn, raises 
the possibility that interpersonal differences in commuting can be endogenous in a 
model for the age at retirement.
15 
We consider appropriate for analytical purposes the econometric model discussed in 
Wooldridge (2002, p. 567): 
  11 11 21 , yy u α =+ + z δ  (6) 
  22 2 , yu =+ zδ  (7) 
  () 33 3 10 . yu =+ > zδ
16 (8) 
In these expressions,  1 y  represents (the log of) age at retirement,  2 y  denotes commuting 
time or distance,  3 y  is an indicator for non-attrition from the survey (before the moment 
of retirement), z is a vector of assumed exogenous covariates,  1 z  is a strict subset of z; 
                                                 
15 The sample design might also generate right-censored observations, that is, study subjects still 
participating in 2005. In this study, however, all subjects either retire or attrit before that date. 
16 A subindex denoting individuals is skipped for notational simplicity.   11
1 α ,  1 δ ,  2 δ , and  3 δ  are parameters, whereas  1 u ,  2 u , and  3 u  represent arbitrarily 
correlated random errors. Equation (6), a linear regression for (the log of) age at 
retirement, is the equation of interest, equation (7) is a linear projection for the 
potentially endogenous commuting measure, and equation (8) is a selection equation. 
Variable  1 y  is only observed when  3 1 y = , that is, when the study subject remains in the 
survey at least until withdrawing the labor force. 
The equilibrium age-at-retirement gradient discussed in Section 2 concerned the 
location and retirement behavior of identical individuals. Hence, study subjects’ 
heterogeneous characteristics are to be controlled for. Included in  1 z  are covariates 
emphasized by previous research on the timing of retirement (among many others, 
Mincer 1974, Filer and Petri 1988, Bound et al. 1996, and Coile 2004) and that could 
also affect location decisions: earnings, asset income, occupation, schooling, capacity 
for work, marital status, wife’s employment status, and family size. Unfortunately, 
information on pension and social security wealth was not collected in the PSID during 
most of the survey waves included in this study. Even so, social security and pension 
benefit levels depend on previous earnings, and the more educated are more likely to 
have a pension (Taubman 1981). Moreover,  1 z  includes a set of year-of-birth dummies, 
which control, e.g., for changes in social security provisions that differently affected 
different cohorts of workers. Capacity for work is proxied by responses to the question: 
“Do you have a physical or nervous condition that limits the type of work, or the 
amount of work you can do?” Although there are a number of reasons to be suspicious 
about self-reported work limitations (Bound et al. 1995), alternative health measures are 
not available for most survey waves used in this study. Income variables are measured 
in real terms, with amounts deleted if they are below the corresponding first percentile 
or above the corresponding 99
th percentile. Asset income is made up of rents, interests, 
dividends, and the asset part of business income; if a study subject is married or 
cohabiting, his income from assets includes the asset income of his partner. Potential 
left-truncation in retirement age is controlled for with a set of age-at-data-wave 
dummies included in  1 z . The difficulty to obtain data on price levels for other 
consumption goods and, specially, housing space (a commodity whose price varies 
across the urban space), make these variables to be excluded from the econometric 
model for age at retirement and Q  and  X  to be assumed weakly separable from L. 
Study subjects’ observations pertain to different urban areas and to different time 
periods. On the one hand, as expression (5) suggests, the size of the age-at-retirement 
gradient might differ across urban areas if, for example, C′, the derivative of the 
commuting expenses schedule, changes across areas (e.g., as a consequence of different 
urban transportation systems). On the other hand, the fact of having observations   12
corresponding to different time periods opens the possibility that an urban area’s level 
of commuting expenses for a given distance may have changed. The solution to the 
gradient heterogeneity problem is complicated. Survey confidentiality commitments 
preclude knowing study subjects’ precise areas of residence, and even if these areas 
were known, the presence of just a few observations per area would preclude obtaining 
precise area-level estimates. Since the structure of transportation networks seems an 
important determinant of C′, I will instead run a pooled estimation interacting 
commuting variables with the size of the largest city in the area of residence, assuming 
that central cities of similar size have similar transportation networks. A change in the 
level of commuting expenses for a given distance,  () CD, may be modeled as a time 
effect. Since by knowing the year of birth and the age at the data wave we may know 
the year the data wave belongs to, the sets of year-of-birth and age-at-data-wave 
dummies included in  1 z  do control for time effects. 
The main explanatory variable in equation (6),  2 y , represents either commuting distance 
or commuting time. Although both dimensions are highly connected (their sample 
correlation amounts to 0.75), they could differ in terms of amenability to policy 
intervention, rendering important to know the effects exerted by each dimension on the 
timing of retirement. As noted before, commuting characteristics can be endogenous in 
a model for age at retirement. I propose study subjects’ race as an instrument for 
commuting. One of the main assumptions of the spatial mismatch hypothesis literature 
(see Kain 1992, Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist 1998, and Gobillon et al. 2007 for surveys of 
this literature) is that blacks are disconnected from jobs: blacks mainly remained in the 
centres of U.S. urban areas in spite of suburbanization of jobs, especially entry-level 
jobs. Statistics strongly support this assertion (Gobillon et al. 2007). Two main 
explanations have been offered for understanding the causes of blacks’ residential 
segregation and residential inertia in U.S. urban areas. The first, in line with the spatial 
mismatch hypothesis, emphasizes racial discrimination in the housing market, whereas 
the second emphasizes individuals’ racial preferences leading to the spatial separation 
of ethnic groups. Both explanations seem unrelated to preferences for retirement, 
however, suggesting that race could be a valid instrument for commuting 
characteristics.
17 It is well-known, however, that the labor force participation rates of 
older, working-aged black men have historically been lower than those of white men, 
                                                 
17 Another possible instrument would be previous commuting characteristics. For using these as 
instruments of current commuting, however, two conditions must be met: on the one hand, study subjects 
must have changed residence or job between the beginning of the study and the wave of retirement (in our 
sample, only 48% did); on the other hand, the error in a regression equation for expected age at retirement 
(like (6), but with expected age as dependent variable) should be uncorrelated across periods (information 
on expected retirement age was not collected in most PSID survey waves).   13
what suggests that blacks might have a preference for early withdrawal from the labor 
force. However, as shown by Bound et al. (1995, 1996), health differences between 
blacks and whites can account for most of the racial gap in labor force attachment for 
men. (Indeed, it is also possible that commuting differences be partly responsible for 
this racial gap.) 
The estimation method is therefore as follows. We fist obtain  3 ˆ δ  from probit of  3 y  on z 
using all observations (retirees and attritors). Although not necessary for identifying  1 α  
and  1 δ , we shall include the (log of the) number of calls to secure an interview (Lillard 
and Panis 1998) as an exogenous variable affecting non-attrition. The inclusion of this 
variable in z allows assessing the validity of race as an instrument for commuting by 
performing a test of overidentifying restrictions. We then obtain the estimated inverse 
Mills ratios,  ()() 33 3 ˆˆ ˆ λφ =Φ zδ zδ , where  () φ ⋅  and  () Φ⋅ represent the pdf and cdf of the 
standard normal distribution, respectively. Finally, using the subsample of retirees, we 
estimate the equation 
  11 11 21 3 ˆ yy e r r o r αγ λ =+ ++ z δ  (9) 
by Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) using instruments () 3 ˆ ,λ z . 
The final sample contains 1,045 study subjects, of whom 755 retire and 290 drop out 
from the survey before retirement. Sample selection criteria are listed in the data 
appendix. Table 1 offers a set of descriptive statistics. On average, retirement takes 
place in 1981, whereas, as a consequence of the sample design, attrition occurs on 
average earlier, in 1979. Between 1969 and  the  year  of  retirement  or attrition,  35.5 
percent of all subjects move, and near 29 percent change job at least once. On average, 
the data wave corresponds to the 1972 survey wave. Those who retire do so at about 62 
years old, with time and distance to the workplace averaging 23 minutes and near 10 
miles in the waves before retirement, both one-way figures. In total, 26.7 percent of the 
subjects are black. 
3.3. Results 
Tables 2 and 3 show the output of intermediate regressions: the probit for non-attrition 
before retirement (equation 8) and the first-stage regressions for the potentially 
endogenous commuting characteristics (equation 7), respectively. As in previous 
analyses of attrition in the PSID (e.g., Fitzgerald et al. 1998), the R-squared from the 
probit is small:
18 most effects are insignificant, and significant correlates of non-attrition 
                                                 
18 This R-squared measure, defined in the notes to Table 2, is a usual measure of fit in binary-choice 
models.   14
explain little of attrition in the sample. Being married or black significantly reduces the 
probability of abandoning the survey, whereas the number of calls needed to secure an 
interview in the data wave has a strong correlation with future non-response. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of data 
 Retirees    Drop  outs 
  Mean  Std dev    Mean  Std dev 
Age at event (retirement/attrition)  61.7  5.1    56.7  6.6 
Year of event (retirement/attrition) 1981  6    1979  7 
Year of data collection (data wave)  1972  5    1972  4 
Distance to workplace (miles, one-way) 9.9  10.5   9.5  11.1 
Time to workplace (minutes, one-way) 23.0  18.1    22.3  18.4 
Yearly earnings ($1,000)
a 22.5  15.1    23.6  15.4 
Yearly asset income ($1,000)
a 1.4  3.5    1.5  4.1 
Married (percent)  91.5  27.9    87.2  33.4 
Wife not working (percent)  42.8  49.5    43.8  49.7 
Family > 2 persons (percent)  62.5  48.4    68.3  46.6 
Disabled (percent)  17.2  37.8    12.4  33.0 
Less than high school education (percent)  55.4  49.7    56.6  49.7 
More than high school education (percent)  11.4  31.8    14.1  34.9 
Black (percent)  28.5  45.1    22.4  41.8 
Number of calls to secure an interview  2.5  2.1    2.8  2.1 
Moved between 1969 and year of event (percent)  35.5  47.9    35.5  47.9 
Changed job between 1969 and year of event (%)  28.9  45.3    28.6  45.3 
Living in area with largest city of (percent)         
500,000 or more inhabitants  31.8  46.6    33.8  47.4 
50,000 – 499,999 inhabitants  33.1  47.1    35.2  47.8 
Less than 50,000 inhabitants  35.1  47.6    31.0  46.3 
Occupation (percent)           
Professional and technical workers  25.3  46.5    28.6  45.3 
Sales and clerical workers  9.9  29.9    9.0  28.6 
Craftsmen and operators  42.1  49.4    41.0  49.3 
Service workers  18.8  39.1    16.9  37.5 
Farm managers and laborers  3.8  19.2    4.5  20.7 
Individuals 755    290 
Notes: 
a 1982-1984 dollars      15
 
Table 2. Probit for non-attrition (estimated coefficients) 
Earnings ($1,000)  .0026 (.0039) 
Asset income ($1,000)  -.0094 (.0132) 
Married .4960  (.1668)* 
Wife not working  -.1414 (.0959) 
Family > 2 persons  .0636 (.1141) 
Disabled .1825  (.1268) 
Less than high school  -.1675 (.1099) 
More than high school  -.1990 (.1698) 
Sales and clerical worker -.0524  (.1770) 
Craftsman or operator  -.0288 (.1352) 
Service worker  -.0660 (.1719) 
Farm manager or laborer  -.2662 (.2508) 
Black .2669  (.1203)* 
Log of number of calls  -.1597 (.0715)* 
Intercept -.3796  (.3000) 
Observations  1,045 
Drop outs  290 
Log-likelihood  -554.90 
R
2  .1009 
Notes: Estimation includes birth-year dummies and age-at-data-wave dummies. Standard errors 
are in parentheses. R
2 equals one minus the ratio of the log likelihood of the fitted function to 
the log likelihood of a function with only an intercept. * Significant at 5%. 
 
Table 3 shows the estimated linear projections for commuting distance (in its first 
column) and commuting time (second column). In line with previous findings on U.S. 
families’ location patterns by income (e.g., Glaeser et al. 2008), we find that higher 
earnings are positively correlated with distance/time to the workplace. Income from 
assets, however, tends to be negatively correlated with time. As in Madden (1980), 
being married has a strong positive effect on commuting distance/time, though the 
wife’s employment status is insignificant for commuting. The former effect could be 
due to married men locating in the suburbs as a consequence of having more children 
(housing space is cheaper there) and/or better financial prospects (assuming the income 
elasticity of housing demand exceeds the elasticity of commuting cost with income) 
than unmarried men. Since being more than two persons in the family unit appears 
unrelated to commuting, the second explanation seems more credible. The insignificant 
effect of wife’s employment status on commuting distance/time could be the 
consequence of a pair of counteracting forces: on the one hand, a working wife would 
increase household income (though the difference in income between two-earner and   16
traditional households is not big because the participation rate of married women is 
inversely related to husband’s earnings (Hekman 1980)), generating a tendency to live 
further from the CBD if the income elasticity of housing demand exceeds the elasticity 
of commuting cost with income; on the other hand, two-earner households would be 
pull closer to the CBD to avoid doubling commuting costs. Interestingly, while having a 
limitation in the capacity to work is not correlated with commuting distance, it is 
associated with an increase in (one-way) commuting time of approximately 5 minutes. 
Having limitations in the kind and/or amount of work that can be done might indicate 
the presence of limitations in the ability to travel around, which could influence the 
choice of commuting mode and/or reduce the walking speed (thus, for example, 
increasing the walking time between the parking lot and the home/workplace). By 
occupations, farmers are by far those showing shorter commutes. The statistical 
significance of the inverse Mills ratio in the equation for commuting time suggests that 
unobserved characteristics affecting the decision to abandon the survey are related to 
unobserved characteristics affecting the duration of commutes. Most importantly for our 
purposes, we find that, other things constant, blacks have longer commutes than non-
blacks (these made up essentially of whites): being black is associated to living about 3 
miles further from the workplace and to devoting about 13 minutes more to a one-way 
commute. Other multivariate studies finding longer commutes for blacks include Chung 
et al. (2001) and Gabriel and Rosenthal (1996). The former study, using 1980 and 1990 
Census Public Use Microdata Samples for Chicago and Los Angeles, finds that the 
commute times for Hispanics and whites were about the same, while blacks’ was higher 
than either. Similarly, findings in Gabriel and Rosenthal (1996), who use data from the 
1985 and 1989 American Housing Survey, indicate that, even after adjusting for 
neighbourhood fixed effects, earnings, and education, black workers have significantly 
longer commutes than comparable Asian and white workers. Table 3 also reports the 
value of the F statistic for the test that the instruments (being black as well as the 
number of calls to secure an interview) do not enter the first-stage regressions. 
Instruments are weakly correlated with distance, but much more correlated with time (it 
is indeed difficult to explain for what reason the number of calls to secure an interview 
is statistically significant—at the 10%—in the equation for commuting time). 
Table 4 shows the output of estimating the model in equation (9) by OLS (in its first and 
second columns) and 2SLS (columns 3 and 4). The columns with the 2SLS estimates 
report also the value of the Sargan’s statistic for testing the validity of the excluded 
instruments. This statistic is calculated as the number of observations times the R-
squared from a regression of the 2SLS residuals on the full set of instruments. The null 
hypothesis that the instruments are valid cannot be rejected, with p-values well above 
standard significance levels. In general, OLS estimated coefficients tend to be rather   17
similar to those estimated by 2SLS. We have indeed performed a formal test of 
endogeneity of commuting distance/time by extending equation (9) with residuals from 
regressions in columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 (one residual at a time), and then testing 
for the statistical significance of this extra variable. The null hypothesis that commuting 
characteristics are exogenous cannot be rejected at standard significance levels (p-
values are 0.411 for commuting distance and 0.324 for commuting time). We therefore 
concentrate the discussion on the estimates shown in columns (1) and (2) of Table 4, as 
OLS is more efficient than 2SLS in the present context. 
Table 3. Estimated linear projections for commuting characteristics 




Time (minutes, one-way) 
Earnings ($1,000)  .1001 (.0365)**  .2685 (.0605)** 
Asset income ($1,000)  -.1265 (.1277)  -.3948 (.2114)* 
Married  6.433 (3.066)**  17.218 (5.076)** 
Wife not working  .7377 (1.121)  -1.201 (1.857) 
Family > 2 persons  -.8875 (1.002)  .1130 (1.660) 
Disabled  .4587 (1.371)  5.110 (2.270)** 
Less than high school  -.1395 (1.314)  -2.637 (2.176) 
More than high school  -2.185 (1.856)  -8.879 (3.072)** 
Sales and clerical worker  -.0897 (1.542)  -1.038 (2.552) 
Craftsman or operator  .9150 (1.199)  1.383 (1.984) 
Service worker  2.505 (1.539)  4.597 (2.548)* 
Farm manager or laborer  -5.660 (2.650)**  -19.795 (4.387)** 
3 ˆ λ   9.827 (11.909)  57.292 (19.717)** 
Black  3.110 (1.706)*  13.250 (2.825)** 
Log of number of calls  -.3116 (.9933)  -3.122 (1.645)* 
Intercept  -43.72 (19.57)**  -5.416 (11.82) 
F (excluded instruments)  2.37  12.30 
R
2 0.115  0.184 
Observations 755 
Notes: All estimations include birth-year dummies and age-at-data-wave dummies. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%.   18
 
Table 4. OLS and 2SLS regressions for age at retirement 
  Dependent variable: log of age at retirement 








Miles, one-way  -.00048 (.00027)*    .0022 (.0033)   
Minutes,  one-way   -.00021  (.00016)   .0006  (.0008) 
Earnings ($1,000)  .00069 (.00024)**  .00069 (.00024)**  .00048 (.00036)  .00055 (.00027)** 
Asset income ($1,000)  .0003 (.0009)  .0003 (.0009)  .0006 (.0009)  .0005 (.0009) 
Married  .0156 (.0140)  .0144 (.0140)  .0072 (.0178)  .0131 (.0138) 
Wife not working  -.0001 (.0062)  -.0002 (.0063)  -.0041 (.0082)  -.0026 (.0066) 
Family > 2 persons  .0120 (.0069)*  .0123 (.0069)*  .0141 (.0076)*  .0124 (.0067)* 
Disabled  -.0230 (.0077)**  -.0227 (.0077)**  -.0213 (.0082)**  -.0226 (.0076)** 
Less than high school  -.0010 (.0070)  -.0008 (.0071)  -.0037 (.0080)  -.0033 (.0074) 
More than high school  .0247 (.0110)**  .0246 (.0110)**  .0273 (.0118)**  .0269 (.0110)** 
Sales or clerical worker  -.0156 (.0106)  -.0155 (.0106)  -.0168 (.0110)  -.0167 (.0105) 
Craftsman or operator  -.0062 (.0083)  -.0062 (.0083)  -.0098 (.0096)  -.0088 (.0086) 
Service worker  -.0080 (.0101)  -.0077 (.0101)  -.0178 (.0160)  -.0155 (.0126) 
Farm manager or laborer  .0164 (.0166)  .0157 (.0167)  .0282 (.0225)  .0267 (.0196) 
3 ˆ λ   .0222 (.0412)  .0222 (.0412)  .0292 (.0432)  .0270 (.0407) 
Intercept  4.008 (.0460)**  4.008 (.0461)**  3.988 (.053)**  3.993 (.0476)** 
Sargan’s statistic (1 over-
identifying restriction) 
    .074 [.786]  .011 [.915] 
R
2  .345 .343 .251 .317 
Observations 755 
Notes: All estimations include birth-year dummies and age-at-data-wave dummies. Standard errors are in parentheses and 
probability values are in brackets. * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. 
 
We find negative estimates associated to commuting variables. Although, as discussed 
before, a certain fraction of the sample commutes might not be trips to the CBD, but 
circumferential trips not ending in the CBD, this result suggests that the sign of 
expression (5) is positive. The estimated effects of commuting are small, being 
statistically different from zero at the 10% in the case of distance to the workplace only. 
As a consequence, the role of the age-at-retirement gradient in the urban space as an 
explanatory factor for earlier retirement is not significant: since a one-mile increase in 
the home-workplace separation is estimated to reduce age at retirement by 
approximately 0.05 percent, the increase in the home-workplace separation of about 6 
miles observed among U.S. older workers in the last three decades of the 20th century   19
would have caused a reduction of about 0.3% in retirement age (somewhat more than 2 
months if initial retirement age were 65 years old). Keeping other things constant, 
higher earnings lead to later retirement, suggesting that the substitution effect of an 
earnings increase dominates the income effect. Later retirement ages are also found 
among male heads of families with more than two persons and among those more 
educated, this latter effect perhaps as a consequence of more educated individuals 
having steeper age-earnings profiles (Mincer 1974). Suffering a limitation in the 
capacity for work is estimated to reduce retirement age by a significant 2.3 percent. We 
find no evidence of non-random attrition from the PSID: the coefficient associated to 
the inverse Mills ratio is statistically not different from zero. 
Finally, Table 5 offers the (selected) output of a pair of OLS estimations of equation (9) 
where the commuting variables (distance in column 1, time in column 2) have been 
interacted with dummies for the size of the biggest city in area. As discussed previously, 
the size of the age-at-retirement gradient might be heterogeneous across urban areas. To 
control in some extent for this possibility, three dummy variables representing areas 
whose biggest city contains 500,000 inhabitants or more (big city), between 50,000 and 
499,999 inhabitants (medium city), and less than 50,000 inhabitants (small city) have 
been created. In the estimations, the interaction of commuting variables with big city is 
the unreported category. No significant differences in the size of the age-at-retirement 
gradient across urban areas of different size are detected. 
Table 5. OLS regressions for age at retirement (selected estimated 
coefficients) 
  Dependent variable: log of age at retirement 




Miles, one-way  -.00074 (.00039)*    
Miles*medium city in area  .00028 (.00051)    
Miles*small city in area  .00043 (.00044)    
Minutes, one-way      -.00028 (.00017) 
Minutes*medium city in area      -.00001 (.00024) 
Minutes*small city in area      .00029 (.00023) 
R
2 .345    .345 
Observations 755 
Notes: Estimations include controls reported in Table 4, birth-year dummies, and age-at-
data-wave dummies. Standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10% 
 
   20
4. CONCLUSION 
This paper has made two points. By extending a standard model of residential location 
and labor supply, we have shown that commuting and retirement can be causally related 
as a consequence of an equilibrium age-at-retirement gradient in the urban space: 
workers living further from the CBD, but being identical in all other respects to those 
residing closer, may retire at a different age as a consequence of the different 
commuting costs and housing space prices they face. It is an empirical matter to assess 
the sign and magnitude of this gradient, but if the commodity “years of leisure” is a 
normal good and if years of leisure and housing space are Slutsky complements (as 
wells as some additional conditions), workers living further from the CBD will retire 
earlier. 
Secondly, we have quantified the magnitude of the age-at-retirement gradient for the 
U.S. economy, which allows assessing the role that the rise in the home-workplace 
separation observed among U.S. older male workers in the last three decades of the 20th 
century may have had in reducing their LFPR. A linear regression model for age at 
retirement has been estimated with data provided by the PSID and using an instrumental 
variables approach: commuting distance/time could be jointly decided with age at 
retirement, and is instrumented with workers’ race. The validity of race as an instrument 
for commuting cannot be rejected, being race also sufficiently partially correlated (with 
commuting time) to be considered a reliable instrument. We have found some evidence 
of an effect of commuting on retirement, by which workers residing further from the 
workplace would tend to retire earlier, but the size of the effect seems insufficient for 
the increase in home-workplace separation to partly account for the decreasing trend in 
male LFPR in the U.S.   21
APPENDIX A.  TECHNICAL APPENDIX 
In this appendix we specify more fully the residential location and labor supply model 
outlined in Section 2, giving special emphasis to the mathematical derivation of the 
analytical results discussed in the main text. The worker’s problem of choosing the most 
preferred residential location and retirement age given constraints can be formalized as 
a classical consumer demand problem. Let the worker’s preferences be summarized by 
the utility function 
  () ,,, UU L Q X D = , (A1) 
which is assumed twice continuously differentiable, increasing in the first three 
arguments, decreasing in the fourth argument, and strictly quasiconcave. Let the matrix 
Φ be given by  
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where subscripts denote partial derivatives: for example, 
1(,, , ) (,, , ) UL Q X D U L Q X D L =∂ ∂  and  12(,, , ) (,, , ) UL Q X D U L Q X DL Q =∂ ∂ ∂ . By the 
strict quasiconcavity of  () U ⋅ ,  33 0 Φ>,  44 0 Φ<, and  0 Φ> , where  rr Φ  denotes the 
rr ×  submatrix of Φ where only the first r  rows and r  columns are retained. In 
maximizing utility, workers are subject to the time constraint 
  TLH =+  (A3) 
and the budget constraint 
  () () X RDQ CDH W H Y ++ ≤ + , (A4) 
which can be combined in the form of a full-income budget constraint: 
  () () () () () X RDQ W CD L F W CD T Y ++ − ≤ ≡ − + . (A5) 
A1. Equilibrium 
In order to facilitate the discussion of the equilibrium, the worker’s decision-making 
process is decomposed into two stages. In the first stage, optimal quantities of L,  Q , 
and  X  are chosen for a given distance, obtaining a constrained or short-run maximum 
of utility. In the second stage, distance itself is chosen so as to maximize utility. 
At a distance D from the CBD, workers solve   22
  ()
,, max   , , ;
LQX UU L Q X D =  (A6)
  () () s. t.  X R Q WC LF WC TY ++− ≤ ≡− + , (A7) 
where dependence of R and C  on D has been dropped for notational simplicity. The 
Lagrangean function of this optimization model is 
  () ( ) ( ) () ,,; UL Q XD W CT Y X R Q W CL λ +− + − − − − , (A8) 
and the necessary first-order conditions are 
  () () 0 WC TYXR QWC L −+ − − − −= , (A9) 
  () 1 0 UW C λ −− = , (A10) 
  2 0 UR λ −= , (A11) 
  3 0 U λ −=. (A12) 
From (A10)-(A12), the usual equilibrium conditions stating that the marginal rate of 
substitution between two goods equals the ratio of their marginal costs are obtained. Let 


















where second-order partial derivatives are evaluated at some point satisfying the first-
order necessary conditions. Sufficient conditions for a constrained optimum are  33 0 Ρ> 
and  0 Ρ< . Using expressions (A10)-(A12), we see that  33 3 3 2
1
λ




Ρ= Φ . Hence, the strict quasiconcavity of  () U ⋅  guarantees that the sufficient 
conditions for an optimum are met. First-order conditions (A9)-(A12) have continuous 
partial derivatives with respect to all endogenous and exogenous variables, and the 
following Jacobian determinant 
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=− Ρ =− Φ ≠ . 
Then, by the implicit function theorem, for some neighborhood of the solution there 
exist implicit short-run demand functions   23
  () () ,, ; LL F WCR D =−, (A15) 
  () () ,, ; QQ F WCR D =−, (A16) 
  () () ,, ; X XFW C R D =−, (A17) 
generally expressed as 
  () 12 ,,; jj Z ZF P P D = , (A18) 
with  1 Z L = ,  2 Z Q = ,  3 Z X = ,  () 1 PW C =− , and  2 PR = . 
The constrained maximum of utility obtained at a distance D from the CBD is denoted 
() ( ) ,,; UD UL Q XD = , where L,  Q , and  X  are the utility-maximizing demands 
satisfying expressions (A9)-(A12). In order to know how changes in D alter the 
constrained optimum, we firstly use the chain rule: 
  () () () ()
12 3 4







Then, by the envelope theorem, 






′′ =− + +
∂
. (A20) 
A full equilibrium is thus attained when expression (A20) equals zero, meaning that 
workers cannot increase utility by changing their residential location. Jointly with the 
first-order conditions for a constrained optimum, equation (A20) forms a system of five 
equations in five unknowns that can be solved for the utility-maximizing demand 
equations and an equation determining the optimum residential location: 
  () 12 ,, jj Z FPP =Ψ  (A21) 
  () 12 ,, D D FPP =Ψ . (A22) 
Demand equations (A21) represent long-run demands where the worker has previously 
adjusted its location with (A22) to maximize utility. 
Rewriting the equilibrium condition for the second step of utility maximization, we 





′′ −= − + . (A23) 
Before discussing the comparative statics of the model, the direction of the worker’s 
move in case both sides of (A23) are of different size is to be determined. We assume 





′′ ′′ −≤ −+ , (A24) 
i.e., the slope of the marginal commuting costs curve is no lower than the slope of the 




′′ −< − + , workers must 
move closer to the CBD to restore equilibrium. As argued by Muth (1969, p.25), 
condition (A24) makes the optimum distance to be spatially stable. 
A2. Comparative-static  analysis 
In deriving the comparative-static results of the model, we work towards a twofold goal. 
On the one hand, as usual, we assess the consequences for endogenous variables of 
changes in model parameters. On the other hand, we assess the consequences for 
endogenous variables of changes in the equilibrium distance. As distance to the CBD is 
under the worker’s control, it might seem we are mistakenly labeling this part of the 
analysis as comparative-static. Yet, given the structure of the model, a change in 
distance is formally equivalent to an exogenous change in the price of housing and the 
level of commuting costs, for example. Thus, it may be properly considered here. 
Long-run responses to variations in parameters can be related to constrained, short-run 
responses by means of the chain rule. For example: 
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. (A25) 
The total effect of a change in a parameter may be conceptually decomposed into two 
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. On the other hand, the effect 
caused by the variation in housing prices and commuting costs as a consequence of the 
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. We are particularly 











. The next paragraphs lay out the pieces 
that allow assessing the effects of changes in parameters on long-run demands. 
The properties of the constrained demand functions in (A15)-(A17) can be expressed in 
terms of full-income,  j μ , and partial substitution effects,  ji s :   25









== ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ∂∂ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
, (A26) 
where the subscript U  indicates a compensated price response holding (constrained) 
utility constant. Totally differentiating the first-order conditions (A9)-(A12) we have 
()







dH Q H d Y WC R
dL dW WC U U U
dQ dR RU U U




−− ⎡ −− − − ⎤⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤
⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ − −− ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ =
⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ −
⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥
− ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦
. (A27) 
Assuming that only non-labor income varies: 
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LY WC U U U
QY RU U U
XY UU U
λ ∂∂ − ⎡ −− − − ⎤⎡ ⎤⎡⎤
⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢⎥ ∂∂ −− ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢⎥ =
⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢⎥ ∂∂ −
⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢⎥
∂∂ − ⎣ ⎦⎣⎦ ⎣⎦
. (A28) 
By Cramer’s rule, 
  () () () ()
2 12 12






















44 Φ  is the adjoint of element () 1, 2  in  44 Φ . Also, 











Non-labor income effects coincide with full-income effects, for 






Assuming that only the wage rate varies, 
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∂∂ − ⎡ −− − − ⎤⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤
⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ∂∂ −− ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ =
⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ∂∂ −
⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
∂∂ − ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦
. (A31) 
By Cramer’s rule, 



























, (A33)   26
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jj j ZZ Z WC
CW C C W C
∂∂ ∂ ∂−
== −
∂∂ − ∂ ∂ −
, partial effects with respect to the level of 
commuting expenses are equal in magnitude, but opposite in sign, than those generated 
by changes in W . 
Assuming that only R varies, 
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∂∂ ⎡ −− − − ⎤⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤
⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ∂∂ −− ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ =
⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ∂∂ −
⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
∂∂ − ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦
. (A35) 
Again by Cramer’s rule, 
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. (A38) 





, distance is treated as if it were another parameter, so that 
the procedure is formally identical to that just followed to obtain constrained demand 
responses. Short-run demands are totally differentiated with respect to D. If 








′′ + ⎡ ⎤





is added to the right-hand side matrix in (A27). Also, the term dD  is to be added to the 
right-hand side vector in (A27) occupying a position in accordance to the position 
occupied by the column added to the matrix. Assuming that only D varies,   27
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′′ ∂∂ + ⎡ −− − − ⎤⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤
⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ′ ∂∂ − −− ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ =
⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ′ ∂∂ −
⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
∂∂ − ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦
. (A40) 
By Cramer’s rule, 
  () 11 11 2
L
QR HC C s R s
D
μ
∂ ′′ ′′ =− + − +
∂
, (A41) 
  () 22 12 2
Q
QR HC C s R s
D
μ
∂ ′′ ′′ =− + − +
∂
, (A42) 
  () 33 13 2
X
QR HC C s R s
D
μ
∂ ′′ ′′ =− + − +
∂
. (A43) 














′′ ≡− + + . Variable γ  stands for the net costs (respectively, net savings) of a 
very short move from the equilibrium location and away from (towards) the CBD. For 
example, starting from a position of equilibrium, an increase in γ  due to some variation 
in a parameter would imply that, at the former equilibrium location, marginal 
commuting costs would now exceed marginal housing space savings, and, under 
condition (A24), the worker would move closer to the CDB to restore equilibrium. 










∂∂∂ ∂ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ′′ =++ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ∂∂∂ ∂ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
. (A44) 
The first two terms on the right-hand are negative whenever a rise in non-labor income 
expands short-run demands for housing space and leisure. The sign of the last term, 
however, is not known (it would be positive if the utility function is strictly concave, for 
then  0
D Y
λ ∂ ⎛⎞ < ⎜⎟ ∂ ⎝⎠










⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ∂∂∂ ∂ ′′ =++ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ∂∂∂ ∂ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
. (A45)   28
APPENDIX B. DATA APPENDIX 
This appendix lists the sample selection criteria observed in the construction of the 
sample object of study. For purposes of replication, either marginal loses of 
observations or surviving number of observations are provided after applying each 
selection criterion. 
The sample is obtained from a PSID data set made up of “All Individuals Data” files 
that were successively downloaded from the PSID Data Center 
(http://simba.isr.umich.edu/) between October 2006 and July 2008. This data set 
contains information for the 53,005 individuals interviewed by the PSID between 1968 
and 1993, although included variables cover the period 1968-2005 (waves 1-34), and a 
total of 1,802,170 observations (person-years) are present in the data set. I keep only 
observations corresponding to heads or wives of PSID families (1,434,387 person-years 
lost). Then, I select men only, aged 41-60 in 1969, and that in 1969 are participating in 
the labor force. 1,134 persons satisfy these criteria, of whom 804 retire and 330 abandon 
the sample before retiring (including, as explained in the main text, 18 persons that 
move or change job after the 1986 interview). To be included in the final sample, these 
persons have to provide valid data in at least one survey wave since the data wave 
through the wave previous to retirement/attrition. (Invalid answering codes for 
commuting are 99 (in the case of miles) and 999 (in the case of time). Earnings and 
asset income below the corresponding 1
st percentile or above the corresponding 99
th 
percentile are deleted.) As a consequence of this criterion, 89 subjects are dropped and 
1,045 remain in the sample, of whom 755 retire and 290 abandon the survey before 
retiring.   33
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